Trump’s 242 measures against Cuba
The primary source of Cuba’s shortages today
One can find on the Website of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs a compendium of measures by Trump against Cuba. It lists the 242 anti-Cuban economic and financial measures, sanctions, announcements, and extensions emitted by the administration of Donald Trump from June 8, 2017, to January 15, 2021. It declares that “the hostile policy of the government of Donald Trump against Cuba included measures and actions without precedent, which stand out for their systematic character. All spheres of our society and the daily lives of citizens have suffered from the impact of this plan, accentuated in the context of the pandemic.” The Website further notes that the actions were undertaken with the intention of intensifying the blockade and “economically asphyxiating the country, subverting the internal order, creating a situation of ungovernability, and overthrowing the Revolution.” With “emphasis on hampering major sources of revenue and hindering our trade relations,” the actions were “notorious in scope.”
In reviewing the 242 measures, I find that they can be placed in eight categories. First, there was a persistent effort to block the delivery of petroleum to the country, which has had a significant impact on the transportation and energy systems, adversely affecting the daily life of the people. Secondly, fines were imposed on companies and banks in the USA and in third countries that had allegedly violated the U.S. restrictions with respect to Cuba, which has had a chilling effect on foreign commerce and investment in Cuba, resulting in a shortage of supplies necessary for production and consumer goods, significantly affecting daily life. Thirdly, countries were pressured to end their agreements with Cuba with respect to medical cooperation. This constituted an attack on a Cuban sector that had been central to Cuba’s economic development plan for decades, involving the scientific development of the pharmaceutical and health industries, enabling Cuba to participate in international commerce under more favorable economic terms. The economic impact of these measures against medical cooperation has been considerable, independent of the positive human benefits in third countries of agreement with Cuba in the health and pharmaceutical field.
Fourthly, measures were imposed that impeded the importation from any country of products made of more than 10% of U.S. components, thus curtailing the Cuban capacity to purchase supplies and products, which has greatly affected food production and public transportation. Fifth, Title III of Helms-Burton has been activated, affecting commerce and investment with Cuban entities associated with properties that were nationalized by the Cuban Revolutionary Government decades ago, having a chilling effect on foreign investment. Sixth, Cuba has been arbitrarily included on a list of countries that supposedly sponsor terrorism, enabling the U.S. government to block financial transactions and to prevent the completion of commercial agreements. Seventh, further restrictions on travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens and residents have been imposed, adversely affecting tourism, the nation’s principal industry. Eighth, the limit on family remittances was reduced, and remittances to non-family persons were prohibited, thus curbing the widespread practice of Cubans receiving financial support from family living abroad and from Cuban émigrés.
Fifty of the measures were imposed in 2017; forty-four, in 2018; eighty-six, in 2019; fifty-five, in 2020; and seven in January 2021 before Trump left office. The Website of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs characterizes 136 of the 242 measures as extra-territorial, affecting companies, banks, entities, and persons in third countries.
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(1) Stopping the supply of petroleum to Cuba.
Measures were adopted against ships, shipping companies, insurance companies, and reinsurers tied to the transportation of fuel. In 2019 alone, fifty-three ships and twenty-seven companies were penalized. The Trump administration campaign against the supplying of petroleum to Cuba has resulted in shortages in transportation and electricity, greatly affecting daily life.
For example, on April 5, 2019, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned 34 ships that were the property of the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA, as well as two companies headquartered in Liberia and Greece, alleging that the companies lent services to Venezuela in providing crude oil to Cuba. The sanctions included the freezing of financial assets that were under the jurisdiction of the United States.
On April 12, 2019, OFAC sanctioned four companies that operate in the Venezuelan petroleum sector and nine oil tankers dedicated to the transportation of Venezuelan crude oil, some of which could have transported oil to Cuba in 2019.
On September 17, 2019, OFAC included on the List of Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) seventeen companies based in Colombia, Panama, and Italy, alleging that they were involved in transporting petroleum to Cuba. Said list contains tens of thousands of companies, organizations, and individuals who have been identified as posing a threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy.
On September 24, 2019, OFAC placed on the SDN List four companies from Panama and Cyprus for their involvement in the transportation of Venezuelan petroleum.
On December 3, 2019, OFAC placed five Venezuelan ships and one ship with a Panamanian flag on the SDN List for transporting crude oil to Cuba.
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(2) Fines on US and international companies and banks.
During the Trump administration, fines were imposed, sometimes hefty fines, on companies and banks in the USA and in third countries, in some cases prestigious and well known.
On October 5, 2018, OFAC imposed a fine of more than five million dollars on J.P. Morgan Chase for undertaking unauthorized transactions and providing unauthorized services from 2008 to 2012.
On November 19, 2018, OFAC announced agreement with the French banking/financial entity Société Générale, headquartered in Paris, for the payment of 1.34 billion dollars to settle fines imposed by OFAC for alleged violations of restrictions with respect to Iran, Sudan, and Cuba. With respect to Cuba, Société Générale had been accused of carrying out $5.5 billion of transactions involving Cuba from July 11, 2007, to October 26, 2010.
On February 14, 2019, OFAC imposed a fine of $5.5 million on the German company AppliChem for selling its products to Cuba between May 2012 and February 2016. AppliChem fabricates laboratory substances and chemical products for industrial use; AppliChem was operating as a subsidiary of the U.S. company Illinois Tool Works.
On April 9, 2019, OFAC sanctioned the Standard Chartered Bank of England for alleged violations of sanctions programs with respect to Cuba, Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Myanmar. The British company agreed to a legal settlement in the amount of $3.3 trillion to various U.S. governmental institutions.
On October 1, 2019, OFAC imposed a fine of $2.7 million on the General Electric Company, with headquarters in Boston, for 290 alleged violations of the regulations of the Cuba sanctions program. The OFAC accusations were made against three subsidiaries of General Electric located in Canada.
On May 6, 2020, OFAC announced that the U.S. company BIOMIN America had agreed to a settlement payment of 267,862 USD, for alleged violations of Cuban Assets Control Regulations. BIOMIN America is an animal nutrition company with headquarters in Overland Park, Kansas. OFAC alleged that from July 2012 to September 2017, BIOMIN America and its foreign entities had participated without authorization in thirty sales, contracted outside the United States, involving supplies of agricultural production to the Cuban entity Alfarma.
On July 8, 2020, OFAC announced that it had reached a settlement with the U.S. company Amazon. The company agreed to pay $134,523 for allegedly violating various sanctions programs maintained by the U.S. government. According to OFAC, Amazon had processed requests for delivery of merchandize by persons employed by the foreign missions of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria between 2011 and 2018.
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(3) Breaking medical cooperation with Cuba.
Cuba has for decades sought to develop a health and pharmaceutical sector that was well-suited to respond to its conditions as a historically colonized and neocolonized country with enduring conditions of underdevelopment. The strategy involved the development of a scientifically and technologically advanced capacity to respond to the health needs of Cuba and other underdeveloped countries, which also would imply eventual Cuban participation in world commerce as a major supplier of health products and services. It was envisioned that Cuban health and pharmaceutical products and services would enable Cuba to reduce its dependency on the exportation of sugar and tobacco, two industries that are based internationally on low-waged labor. With the intention of providing services in this area to other countries in need and of increasing its international prestige in the health field, Cuba has for decades sent brigades of health professionals to the countries of the Third World, in response to a health crisis or need.
In seeking to discredit Cuban health brigades and in pressuring companies to end health agreements with Cuba, the Trump administration undertook an attack against a sector that is central to Cuba’s development plan and to its prestige in the world. The Website of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains that the economic impact of this campaign against the Cuban health sector has been considerable.
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(4) No products with 10% U.S. components.
Since the earliest days of the imposition of the embargo or blockade of Cuba, the USA took the position that U.S.-made products could not be sold in Cuba. However, in a globalized economy, the implementation of such a regulation can be problematic, because few products are made entirely in one country. For several years, the U.S. government dealt with the issue by maintaining a definition that U.S.-made products have 25% or more U.S. component parts. In its intensification of the blockade, the Trump administration reduced the figure to 10%, thus establishing a limit that excluded many products and supplies produced in the world. The measure was put into effect by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the U.S. Department of Commerce on October 21, 2019. The Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains that, in a globalized economy, this measure constitutes a real obstacle to the attainment of necessary supplies, regardless of whether the supplies are available in a U.S. market or a third-country market.
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(5) Activation of Title III of the Helms-Burton Law.
On April 17, 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced the activation of Title III of the 1996 Helms-Burton Law, to go into effect on May 2, 2019. Title III of the Helms-Burton Law permits demands in U.S. courts by the descendants of former owners of property nationalized by the Cuban Revolutionary Government in the early 1960s. Following the enactment of the Helms-Burton Law, the application of Title III was continually suspended by U.S. presidents for twenty-three years. Since the activation of Title III by the Trump Administration, twenty-eight legal processes have been initiated in U.S. courts, which has reduced incentives for foreign investments in Cuba.
The nationalizations were provoked by the non-cooperation of Cuban big industry with the economic program of the Cuban Revolutionary Government. At the time of the nationalizations, compensation was proposed by the Revolutionary Government, but the Cuban national bourgeoisie opted to leave the country rather than negotiate terms of compensation, believing that the Revolutionary Government would be of short duration.
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(6) Restricting financial transactions of third country banks with Cuba.
On May 13, 2020, the U.S. Department of State notified the Congress of its certification of Cuba as one of the countries that “do not cooperate fully” with the antiterrorist efforts of the United States. Other countries named as non-cooperating states were Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela. On January 11, 2021, Cuba was included on the list of countries that sponsor terrorism. On January 14, 2021, Cuba was included on a list of Foreign Adversaries of the Department of Commerce, by virtue of an executive order signed by Donald Trump.
Financial transactions have been greatly affected by the inclusion of Cuba in the arbitrary list of states that supposedly sponsor terrorism. Financial transactions have been denied. Nine of the twenty-two entities that have agreed to pay monetary penalties pertain to the banking/financial sector, including, as noted above, J.P. Morgan Chase, the French entity Société Générale, and the Standard Chartered Bank of England.
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(7) Increasing travel restrictions for U.S. citizens.
The elimination of individual travel to Cuba through “people to people” exchanges was announced by OFAC on November 8, 2017. Individual people-to-people travel, which involves self-regulation, was established during the Obama opening. The November 8 measure compelled U.S. travelers to travel through groups formed by authorized travel agencies.
On June 4, 2019, OFAC announced the complete elimination of “people-to-people” travel as well as the elimination of licenses for cruise ships to stop in Cuban ports.
On June 13, 2019, the USA imposed sanctions on the U.S. companies Expedia, Hotelbeds USA, and Cubasphere. The three penalized companies had carried out transactions of travel services related to trips to Cuba.
On October 25, 2019, the U.S. Department of Transportation announced the suspension of the flights of U.S. airlines from the United States to Cuba, except for the José Martí International Airport in Havana, to go into effect on December 10. The measure resulted in the suspension of U.S. commercial flights to nine airports in Cuba, which had been established during the Obama opening. The note issued by the Department of Transportation indicated that the measure was adopted in response to a written request by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
On January 10, 2020, the U.S. Department of Transportation suspended until further notice charter flights between the United States and Cuba, except for those with destination to the José Martí International Airport in Havana. On August 13, the suspension was amended to permit emergency and rescue private charter flights considered of interest for the United States.
On June 5, 2020, the U.S. Department of the Treasury denied the renewal of a license that permitted Marriot International to operate a hotel in Cuba.
On September 24, 2020, OFAC eliminated authorization by means of a general license for U.S. professionals to attend conferences or meetings in Cuba related to their professions. It also eliminated general licenses for transactions related to clinics, workshops, expositions, and sports competitions. The practical effect was to leave in place, with these modifications, the twelve categories of authorized travel that had been approved during the Obama administration, including the category of “family visits,” which is of special importance to Cubans residing in the United States.
Individual people-to-people travel and the general license for professionals to attend conferences were restored by OFAC on June 8, 2022, under the Biden Administration. This is consistent with the orientation and the desire of leftist academics and activists, who are a part of Biden’s political base.
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(8) Reducing remittances to Cuba.
On September 6, 2019, OFAC imposed a limit of 1000 USD per trimester on family remittances, and it eliminated non-family remittances of donation. On the same date, it suspended money transfers to Cuba via third countries.
On February 26, 2020, a new norm was put into effect by the U.S. Company Western Union, eliminating the possibility of sending remittances to Cuba from third countries. In addition, the transmission of remittances via the companies Fincimex and AIS, which had been the principal formal channels for remittances, was eliminated.
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Biden in essence preserves the Trump measures and policies.
The Biden Administration has continued the hostile measures of the Trump Administration that seek to asphyxiate the Cuban economy and destabilize the country. So stated Johana Tablada, Deputy Director General of the U.S. Department of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in an exclusive dialogue with Prensa Latina. She declared that “the policy of the Government of Joe Biden has followed in essence the policy of the Government of Donald Trump,” in spite of the fact that Biden declared during the presidential election campaign that he was going to lift measures that affect the Cuban family.
The notable exceptions to the continuation from Trump to Biden are the restorations of the previously long-standing authorization for U.S. academics to attend academic conferences and the Obama policy of individual people-to-people travel. U.S. academics and activists have been able to get the Biden Administration to reestablish the policies that affect their interests and desires, but not to persuade the administration and the Congress to end the blockade, or even to reestablish the soft imperialism of the Obama opening. This is not surprising, because U.S. academics and activists lack the capacity to put before the public a comprehensive explanation of Cuba’s politically advanced system of people’s democracy, a political process that overcomes many of the limitations and contradictions of representative democracy, an explanation that would discredit longstanding counterfactual claims of a dictatorship and human rights violations in Cuba.
Tablada further notes that the Biden administration continues with demagogic distortions and deceitful pretexts, disseminating totally false misinformation, with the support of the most conservative and anti-Cuban sectors of U.S. society, and with the support of mainstream media like The Wall Street Journal. The diplomat noted that there has been a permanent policy of deception with respect to the theme of human rights, occurring as the USA finances programs of intervention in Cuba, seeking to establish the real and permanent violation of human rights of millions of Cubans.
Tablada maintained that because it has let stand the Trump measures of economic asphyxiation, the legacy of the Biden Administration could become the largest migratory wave in the history of Cuba. Each day it becomes more and more clear that the Trump measures maintained by Biden have produced a migratory wave from Cuba, because the measures have affected the availability and prices of basic food items and transportation. However, she declared, the insensitive policy of depriving people of sustenance has not provoked a situation of revolt or destabilization in Cuba, as intended. She maintained that the policy has not attained its principal objective of breaking the will of the Cuban people to move forward. The hostile policy of Trump and Biden is not going to derail the Cuban process of independence and sovereignty, Tablada declared.
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Final considerations
Even though Cuba continues to show sincere willingness to establish normal relations with the USA, Cuba proceeds on the assumption that the blockade is a permanent characteristic of our era. Cuba continues to seek to advance its economic development and to construct its socialism, in spite of the blockade. Central to its strategy is the development of mutually beneficial trade relations with China, Russia, and the nations of the global South. It remains open to mutually beneficial trade with countries and companies of the North, but it casts its hope on the renewed Third World project.
Cuba is far from alone in this alternative construction. The once-colonized and semi-colonized nations and peoples of the earth continue with more vitality than ever in the construction of an alternative international order based on mutually beneficial cooperation and respect for the equal sovereignty of states.
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